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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court to hear 
this appeal by Section 78-2-2(j), U.C.A. 1953, as amended ("orders, 
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(a) Appellant contends that the lower court committed 
reversible error by failing to consider the affidavit of 
appellant's expert witness Dr. Kenneth McHenry. The lower court 
determined as a matter of law that the opposing affidavit of Dr. 
McHenry was served beyond the time limitation provided by Rule 4-
501, U.R.J.A.; whereas service of the affidavit satisfied the 
service requirements for affidavits opposing summary judgment as 
provided by Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.. [Record at 00160-166 (Conclusions 
of Law), addendum "A"] 
A lower court's interpretation of a statute or rule presents 
a question of law. The reviewing court accords conclusions of law 
no particular deference, but review those interpretations for 
correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 665 (Utah 1990) 
(b) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling 
that the opposing affidavit of appellant's other expert witness, 
Dr. Donald Houston, was insufficient because it did not specific-
ally state that he as a general surgeon was familiar with the 
standard of care applicable to the appellee as an obstetrician. 
.- _*d . ' _o supporting affidavit: of appellee s ex. ert 
vr.mesr Dr. Cv, y H. Johnson, was suf f: c ' ^rr- h*- \<~ - • - . ^t 
appellee "^cinr" " •* •. .. - _., .^-.-ervtc and followed 
: „-.j-j-a _> .* obstetrics x;r;c gynecoloc* - " c^ncl' v ; °:i 
appellant contends i - inconsistent w ' . - . 
Joniisr" ' - .-i.jiore amounts to a:, improper Inference. 
[Recoia * *,, 
The plaint: ""f x. x x:v,; .,. ticv^ae 
ex^er r,r-.r .ci.i;^..^ ..^  standard <. _ care cy which 'h? 
defendant's conduct :: ~.v : .- -;.*--•' nfon .J.cnas. 
74-i (Utah Arr *''' - c^.rta::] discic-txo ;c 
>":•--'." .^- - , ,^So.Lb:.,.i.y c: expert tertimoix arc t - determine 
whether the witness : s qualified to *:* 
matter x^ . u ^ u ^.^ 'i Transu. , \?j i ^d i U O , li:-,4 • 'V 
App, _ ^ i xe v:: a 'ouitt: ruling ^ •* -esoect wi?i'." -
reversed unless : ** r'xneri 4* : . •. .i . *-
_,--.o^ <^  _.< ha M: ,:*M *- ;ubstantin "i influence 
Clinging abet- a different result. Anton v. . .:oiaas 
(Utah .-
Appeiiu..x contends that the lower court's Findings of F^ -~f xxa 
Conclusions cf Law are cleans -—rcrx' • . . ^  
adequaf --^  * • • * .. __ ._4x_v^ inferences not permitted 
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in the consideration of motions for summary judgment, and were 
induced by an erroneous view of the law. 
In determining whether the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment as a matter of law, no deference is given by the 
appellate court to the trial court fs view of the law; which is 
itself reviewed for correctness. Reed v. Reed, P.2d , 154 
Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (1991); Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). Findings of fact are 
considered clearly erroneous if they are without adequate 
evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view 
of the law. Western Capital & Securities v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 
(Utah App. 1989). 
(c) Appellant contends that the trial court's exclusion of 
an expert witness affidavit on the basis of late designation of the 
witness as an expert was an abuse of discretion. It is appellant's 
position that affidavits opposing summary judgment are in the 
nature of rebuttal testimony, and that rebuttal witnesses are not 
required to be designated in advance. In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 
1239 (Utah 1980) the exclusion of undesignated expert's testimony 
which was likewise in the nature of rebuttal effectively precluded 
appellant from presenting her case to a jury on its merits, and the 
exclusion was held to be erroneous. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of 
the issue concerning timeliness of opposing affidavits, which 
according to that rule may be served no later than the "day prior" 
to the time fixed for hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case 
This is an action for medical malpractice alleging appellee's 
failure to timely diagnose an adenocarcinoma of the bowel during 
the course of routine prenatal care. 
b. Course of Proceedings 
This action was commenced in February, 1989. On June 18, 
1990, the District Court, Judge Raymond S. Uno presiding, held a 
scheduling conference with both counsel of record appearing. It 
was verbally agreed by the parties1 counsel that designation of 
witnesses was to be accomplished by October 31, 1990, and that 
discovery was to be completed by December 31, 1990. 
On October 5, 1990, defendant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment supported by an affidavit from defendant's expert witness, 
Dr. Gary H. Johnson. Counsel for defendant thereafter verbally 
agreed to extend the time for plaintiff's response until December 
31, 1991. 
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On December 31, 1990, plaintiff responded to defendant's 
motion by serving a memorandum and opposing affidavit from expert 
witness Dr. Donald Houston, On January 7, 1991, defendant filed 
a reply memorandum contending that plaintiff's response failed to 
raise any genuine issue of material fact with the affidavit of Dr. 
Houston for the reason that Dr. Houston, a medical doctor 
specializing in general surgery, could not comment on the standard 
of care applicable to the defendant, a medical doctor specializing 
in obstetrics. In response to that contention, plaintiff on 
January 29, 1991, filed and served another opposing affidavit from 
a board certified obstetrical specialist, Dr. Kenneth McHenry. 
On January 29, 1991, defendant filed a Motion to Strike the 
affidavit of Dr. Kenneth McHenry on grounds that he had not been 
designated as a witness before October 31, 1990, and that the 
affidavit was untimely because it was filed beyond the time allowed 
by Rule 4-501 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
c. Disposition in the Lower Court 
On February 22, 1991, a hearing on defendant's motions was 
held before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Court judge. 
The trial court judge refused to consider either the opposing 
affidavit of Dr. Houston or Dr. McHenry; the former for the reason 
that Dr. Houston was not an obstetrical specialist and the latter 
as being untimely served. The court thereupon determined that 
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without opposing affidavit testimony there was no opposition to the 
affidavit of the defendant's expert, Dr. Gary Johnson; and that in 
the absence of opposing expert testimony, summary judgment of 
dismissal was appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The above Statement of the Case contains an account of the 
facts relevant to this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT L 
r.^ pollant contends that the opposing affidavit of her 
obstetrical expert, Dr. Kenneth McHenry, was timely filed according 
to the provisions of Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
That rule provides ff[T]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits*11 Since the McHenry affidavit was 
served January 29, 1991, and the hearing was held nearly one month 
later on February 22, 1991, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in determining that the affidavit of Dr. McHenry was untimely 
and could not be considered in the summary judgment proceeding. 
POINT II. 
Appellant contends that the nature of the alleged malpractice 
is such as to be within the knowledge and experience of any medical 
practitioner whether a specialist or not; and that the trial court 
erred in refusing to accept or consider the affidavit testimony of 
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Dr.-Houston on the grounds that as a general surgeon he could not 
comment upon the standard of care applicable to appellee as an 
obstetrician even in a matter of general medicine not involving 
obstetrics. 
POINT III. 
Although written designation of Drs. Houston and McHenry as 
expert witnesses occurred after the date of the parties' in-court 
verbal agreement for identification of such witnesses, the trial 
court manifestly erred by imposing a sanction for late designation 
ir- the form of an absolute exclusion of both Dr. Houston's and Dr. 
McHenry!s affidavits; both of which were submitted to the court by 
way of rebuttal, and within the time permitted by the rule 
applicable to summary judgment motions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 
REFUSING TO ACCEPT OR CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF AN OBSTETRICAL SPECIALIST, DR. KENNETH MCHENRY 
AS UNTIMELY WHEN THE DOCUMENT WAS FILED AS AN 
OPPOSING AFFIDAVIT IN ADVANCE OF THE HEARING DATE 
Appellee argues that the affidavit of Dr. Kenneth McHenry was 
properly excluded by the trial court on the basis of untimely 
service thereof, and appellant's failure to designate that witness 
earlier according to the trial court's "directive". Appellant 
maintains that the subject affidavit was timely served according 
7 
to the provisions of Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P., as amended, and that the 
trial court abused its discretion by excluding the affidavit 
contrary to the rule or as an apparent sanction for late 
designation of Dr. McHenry as a witness. 
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in 
summary judgment proceedings "[T]he adverse party prior to the day 
of hearing may serve opposing affidavits." Appellee argues that 
this provision must be read in concert with the preceding sentence 
which states that "The motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing." Appellee's argument 
suggests that only when a motion for summary judgment is served 
within 10 days of the time fixed for hearing may opposing 
affidavits be served prior to the day of hearing.1 Appellee's 
argument is misplaced since the clear language of Rule 56(c) 
requires that motions for summary judgment shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for hearing. Motions for summary 
judgment cannot be served within that 10 day period. Any such 
untimely motion would be a nullity subject to a motion to strike, 
and would require no response by the service of opposing affidavits 
or otherwise. The appellee's argument asks the court to accept the 
illogical notion that only where a motion for summary judgment is 
Record at 00137-00142 
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served in violation of the rule (i.e., within 10 days of the time 
fixed for hearing) may opposing affidavits be served not later than 
the day prior to the hearing under Rule 56(c). In other words, 
appellee's argument is that if the motion is properly served( i.e., 
more than 10 days before the time fixed for hearing) Rule 56(c) is 
meaningless. There is no other or better interpretation to be 
given the rule than that affidavits opposing a motion for summary 
judgment may be served no later than the day prior to the time 
fixed for hearing. 
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules is analogous to Rule 56, 
U.R.C.P.2. Both clearly provide that opposing affidavits to be 
considered by the court may be served no later than the day before 
the hearing. In the federal context, it has been commented that 
Rule 56(c) should be read in conjunction with Rule 6(d), which 
provides that for motions in general, opposing affidavits may be 
served not later than one (1) day before the hearing, and which 
also vests in the court the power to permit opposing affidavits "to 
be served at some other time."3 In this case, it is clear that the 
opposing affidavit of Dr. Kenneth McHenry was timely served 
d
 Reed v. Reed, P. 2d ^  , 154 Utah Adv.Rep 6, 8 (Utah 
1991) (Since the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were patterned after 
the federal rules, this court may examine federal decisions to 
determine the meaning of the rules) 
3
 Moore's Federal Rules Comments, Rule 56(c). 
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according to the provisions of Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. and the recent 
holding in Butterfield v. Qkubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah App. 1990). 
It is clear from the rule's plain language and applicable case 
law that in Utah affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment 
may be served at any time prior to the day of the hearing. In this 
case, plaintiff filed and served the affidavit of Dr. McHenry on 
January 29, 1991, several weeks before the hearing was scheduled. 
In Butterfield v. Qkubo, 790 P. 2d 94 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah 
Court of Appeals considered the matter of timeliness in filing 
opposing affidavits under Rule 56(c), and stated: 
[A]xiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment must not merely be filed with the 
court; it must also be served on opposing counsel no 
later than the day before the hearing on the motion, • .. 
(Emphasis added)(footnote omitted) 
Appellee further argues that the exclusion of the McHenry 
affidavit was appropriate since appellant had not designated Dr. 
McHenry as a witness according to the lower court's "scheduling 
order." In excepting to the lower court's apparent sanction of 
excluding opposing or rebuttal affidavit testimony, appellant 
directs this court's attention to the recent case of Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); wherein the Utah Supreme Court 
identified at least three factors which compelled its decision to 
reverse a district court's similar exclusion. All three of those 
factors appear to be present in this case. The Dugan court 
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described them as follows: 
"First, the court's [scheduling] order was never reduced 
to writing- Although this court is not aware of an 
explicit statutory requirement that pretrial orders in 
this state be written, the practice is encouraged. ... 
Second, the matter was tried before the court without a 
jury. ... Third, the court could have used means other 
than exclusion to sanction [the party] for their non-
compliance with the order, including imposing costs 
incurred by the other parties in obtaining experts." Id. 
at 1244 (citation omitted) 
Appellee argues that the 1987 amended version of Rule 16, 
providing additional sanctions which may be imposed under Rule 37, 
were not available to the Dugan trial court when it excluded expert 
testimony. The 1987 amendment to Rule 16 does not supercede or 
invalidate the Dugan decision for the reason that even if the Dugan 
trial court had the alternative of imposing other sanctions now 
available under Rule 37, it cannot now be said that the court would 
have imposed them instead. Appellee's argument speculates concern-
ing what the trial court would have done in 1980 with alternatives 
made available by the 1987 amendments. Such speculation of course 
has no place in this court's deliberations. Nevertheless, the 
sanction imposed by the lower court in Dugan of excluding expert 
testimony was found to be improper and an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. Although the Dugan trial court did not have 
available to it the alternative Rule 37 sanctions allowed under 
Rule 16, it did impose a sanction which is now available under Rule 
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37, and that was considered by the Utah Supreme to be an abuse of 
discretion. In Dugan, as here, the exclusion of expert testimony 
which is in the nature of rebuttal effectively prevented appellant 
from proving her case. 
Since the McHenry affidavit was served January 29, 1991, and 
the hearing was held nearly one month later on February 22, 1991, 
the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the 
affidavit of Dr. McHenry was untimely, both by reason of the dates 
of service and designation; and that it could not therefore be 
considered in the summary judgment proceeding. 
There is no requirement in the rules or elsewhere that 
affidavits opposing summary judgment motions may only be from 
witnesses who have been previously designated. Opposing affidavits 
are in the nature of rebuttal testimony, and to disallow an 
opposing affidavit for lack of prior designation would be tanta-
mount to refusing to allow a rebuttal witness to testify because 
he had not been designated previously. Rebuttal witnesses need 
never be designated before they are called to testify. The trial 
court committed manifest error in failing to consider the affidavit 
of Dr. McHenry for that reason. 
It is apparent that the trial court interpreted the 
Butterfield decision to mean something other than it says regarding 
the serving of affidavits. There is no other conclusion to be 
12 
drawn from the decision than that opposing affidavits may be served 
no later than the day before the hearing. Plaintiff satisfied that 
requirement by serving the opposing affidavit several weeks before 
the hearing. There is no requirement in the rules or elsewhere 
that opposing affidavits must be filed at the same time as opposing 
memoranda. In this case, the questioned affidavit was obviously 
crucial to the summary judgment issue at hand. The Trial Court 
itself indicated that if the Dr. McHenry affidavit was considered 
it could "arguably rise to the level of defeating defendant's 
motion for summary judgment." [Record at 00158, pg 20] Exclusion 
of that affidavit therefore produced the summary judgment. 
In Utah, a lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
law are considered "clearly erroneous" if they are without adequate 
evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view 
of the law.4 Appellant maintains that the Lower court erred in 
determining that appellant's late designation of witnesses somehow 
violated an earlier scheduling "order" of the court. Specifically, 
the lower court found that there existed a scheduling "order" 
[Record at 00160-166, paragraph 4, addendum "A"], as where no such 
order had in fact ever been served upon the parties as is reflected 
by its unexecuted mailing certificate [Record at 00045-00046, 
Western Capital & Securities v. Knudsviq, 768 P.2d 989, 
991 (Utah App. 1989). 
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addendum "B"]. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
the scheduling "order" precluded the designation of appellantfs 
expert witnesses when it occurred. [Record at 00160-166, para* 5, 
addendum "A"]. The trial court further concluded that the 
affidavit of Dr. McHenry could not be considered because it was not 
timely served under the provisions of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration [Record at 00160-166, para* 5, addendum 
"A"]. 
The lower court's findings and conclusions are clearly 
erroneous in both respects since no scheduling "order" was ever 
served upon the parties, and Rule 4-501 does not control the filing 
of affidavits in opposition to motions for summary judgment under 
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.. Those facts standing alone, and when 
considered under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, 
justify reversal and remand. 
POINT II* 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 
DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFFfS EXPERT WITNESS, 
DR. DONALD HOUSTON WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY 
REGARDING THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE 
REQUIRED OF THE DEFENDANT 
The trial court determined that appellant failed to 
demonstrate that Dr. Houston, as a medical doctor specializing in 
general surgery, was knowledgeable and competent to testify 
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concerning the standard of care applicable to an obstetrical 
specialist; and that appellant had therefore failed to raise any 
issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact, determined that the 
affidavit of appelleefs expert witness, Dr. David H. Johnson, 
stated that "the care the defendant provided complied with the 
standards of care observed and followed by specialists in 
obstetrics and gynecology,•.•", when in fact the actual language 
of the affidavit contains no such statement. [Record at 00160-166, 
para. 7, addendum "A"]. The affidavit of Dr. Johnson, who 
specializes in both obstetrics/gynecology and oncology, does not 
state what the trial court found to be a fact and used as a basis 
for granting summary judgment. The affidavit actually states 
[Record at 00062-00084, para. 8, addendum "C"]: 
"...it is my opinion that the medical care and treatment 
rendered by Dr. Glade B. Curtis to Lorrie Ann Arnold 
complied in all respects with the standards of 
professional care, learning, skill and treatment 
ordinarily possessed and used by practitioners in good 
standing in this and similar communities in 1986. 
(emphasis added) 
It is obvious that the trial court construed the quoted 
affidavit statement to mean that the care rendered by the appellee 
to the appellant complied in all respects with the standards 
applicable to obstetricians, when in fact the affidavit refers only 
to the standards applicable to "practitioners". Since Dr. Johnson 
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has more than one specialty, the standard of care to which he 
refers may be that common to any one of his several specialties. 
By its interpretation of the affidavit contents, the trial court 
construed the term "practitioners" to include obstetricians; while 
the term in its common meaning actually applies to physicians in 
all specialties including surgery, obstetrics, and general 
practice. Although the affidavit contains language to the effect 
that the obstetrical care rendered appellant was appropriate, 
appellant maintains that the recognition and diagnosis of rectal 
cancer is not something peculiar to the practice of obstetrics; but 
is rather within the realm of general medical practice common to 
all practitioners. The obstetrical care rendered appellant is not 
in controversy. The appellant's claim is that appellee failed to 
timely diagnose an adenocarcinoma of the bowel. Recognizing and 
dealing with rectal cancer does not particularly involve the 
activities of an obstetrician, or any other specialist. The 
condition is one which should be recognized and dealt with by any 
competent medical practitioner regardless of his specialty. 
There is no suggestion from any source that the standard of 
care in diagnosing rectal cancer is peculiar to the specialized 
practice of obstetrics. Dr. Johnson's affidavit merely states that 
he is "familiar with the standards of appropriate medical practice 
involved in the evaluation and treatment of patients presenting for 
16 
prenatal care and the development, as in this case, of colorectal 
cancer". The affidavit does not state what the appropriate medical 
practice iss. In view of the fact that Dr. Johnson has more than 
one specialty, and that one of those specialties (oncology) 
involves the specialized diagnosis and treatment of tumors, he is 
undoubtedly familiar with the higher standards of a cancer 
specialist. As applied to this case, the statement is ambiguous 
since it can be read as relating to either the practice of 
obstetrics or oncology. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
analyzes the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the losing party. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
Nat1! Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). In this case, the trial 
court incorrectly drew an inference against the appellant which was 
that Dr. Johnson had addressed the standard of care of an 
obstetrician, when in fact the standard of care he described was 
that for medical "practitioners" and not for obstetricians 
specifically. Appellee has extensively argued the need for expert 
testimony from the specific medical specialty involved, but has 
not provided any testimony which particularly describes the 
applicable standard of care for an obstetrician. It is only Dr. 
McHenry's affidavit that specifically addresses the standards 
applicable to an obstetrician. Under Utah law, all inferences 
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which can be drawn from the affidavit of Dr. Johnson must be viewed 
in a light most favorable to the appellant. From the fact that Dr. 
Johnson has more than one specialty and is therefore familiar with 
more than one standard of care, it is reasonable to infer that his 
failure to specifically state that his evaluation of the case was 
based upon the standard of care for an "obstetrician" means that 
his statement relates to the standards in one of his other 
specialties. In any case, the appellant is under Utah law entitled 
to all reasonable inferences, or in other words the "benefit of the 
doubt" where summary judgment is involved. 
In this case expert medical testimony is required to establish 
the standard of care, departure from the standard, and a 
proximately caused injury. The question is by what standard of 
care the appellee's conduct is to be measured. It is appellantfs 
position that in a case such as this issues of diagnosis, 
treatment, or referral to another physician; matters common to all 
practicing medical doctors regardless whether they practice a 
specialty. Testimony in such cases from another physician who 
happens to practice in the same specialty is not required, but the 
testimony of any competent medical doctor familiar with the 
standards of care applicable to all medical doctors, whether 
specialists or not, should be sufficient. An example to consider 
may be the recognition of cardio-pulmonary arrest, a life-
18 
threatening condition which any competent physician should be able 
to recognize and address, regardless of his specialty. 
At the very least, the trial court could and should have 
allowed plaintiff to provide foundational testimony to that effect 
if the court had any doubt concerning the competence of a physician 
specializing in surgery to comment upon the standards applicable 
to another physician specializing in obstetrics where the diagnosis 
of rectal carcinomas common to all practitioners is involved. 
There is nothing in the record which suggests that the recognition 
of rectal carcinomas is something peculiar to the practice of 
obstetrics. 
In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's ruling which allowed 
the testimony of a medical doctor concerning the standard of care 
in an action against a chiropractor, since it was shown that the 
chiropractor "stepped out of the 'chiropractic field1 and into the 
field of medicine." By an extension of that reasoning, a special-
ist faced with signs and symptoms of disease, the recognition of 
which is common to the general practice of medicine, should at 
least be held to the minimum standards of care applicable to all 
practicing medical doctors, specialist and generalists as well. 
For example, if the appellant presented to an obstetrical 
specialist with obvious signs and symptoms of a severed artery or 
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a compound fracture of the arm which the specialist failed to 
recognize or act upon, the patient should not be required to 
establish the specialist's departure from the applicable standard 
through testimony of another obstetrician, since those conditions 
do not involve specialized knowledge or expertise but rather 
disorders within the common knowledge of all medical practitioners. 
Any medical doctor, whether a specialist or general practitioner, 
who has obtained a basic medical education and holds himself out 
as a practitioner should be held to the same standard of care in 
the diagnosis of common disorders. While the specialist may 
develop greater knowledge and skill in some particular area or 
areas, he remains first and foremost a medical doctor who should 
be held to the same standards as all medical doctors where such 
common disorders are involved. 
In this case, the trial court committed manifest error by 
determining as a matter of law that the standard of care by which 
the appellee's conduct is to be measured is a standard which is 
unique to his specialty, which can only be described by another 
specialist in the same field; and again by disregarding the only 
available evidence specifically dealing with the standards of a 
specialist. The trial court further erred by inferring that Dr. 
Johnson's affidavit addressed the standard of care applicable to 
"obstetricians" when it did not say so, and only because obstetrics 
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happened to be one of Dr. Johnson's several specialties. 
The trial court erred in requiring that the applicable 
standard of care for the recognition and diagnosis of that disorder 
must be established only by the testimony of another physician in 
the same specialty; and erred again in refusing to consider a 
specialist's opposing affidavit which clearly defines the 
applicable standard of care and the appellee's departure from it. 
The medical issue in this case involves such basic, general, 
medical knowledge and practice as to which any competent medical 
doctor, whether a specialist or not, should be competent to 
testify. Dr. Houston has provided such testimony as a medical 
practitioner specializing in general surgery. If a specialist from 
the same specialty does testify as has Dr. McHenry, his testimony 
should at least be considered. If considered, either or both of 
those physicians' affidavits must at least be considered to raise 
issues of fact which preclude summary judgment. 
In order for a nonmoving party to successfully oppose a motion 
for summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not 
necessary for that party to prove its legal theory; it is only 
necessary for the nonmoving party to show facts controverting the 
facts stated in the moving party's affidavit. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988). This 
the appellant has done by serving the opposing affidavits. If 
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either or both were considered by the District Court as required 
by law, or if the inference drawn was against the movant as 
required by law, summary judgment of dismissal would be improper. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
REFUSING TO ACCEPT OR CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVITS 
OF EITHER OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES ON 
THE BASIS OF LATE DESIGNATION OF THE WITNESSES 
Appellant does not dispute that written designation of Dr. 
Donald Houston as an expert witness occurred after the date of the 
partiesf in-court verbal agreement regarding designation of such 
witnesses. Dr. Houston had however been identified earlier in 
answers to interrogatories, and his participation as an expert 
witness certainly came as no surprise to the appellee. The trial 
court manifestly erred by imposing a sanction for "late 
designation" in the form of an outright exclusion of Dr. Houston's 
affidavit testimony. Appelleefs argument that there in fact 
existed a "scheduling order" has only arisen on this appeal. 
Appellee's Motion to Strike filed in the lower court [Record at 
00124-00127] addressed the requirement of filing a designation of 
witnesses. Appellee's motion was not accompanied by the scheduling 
"order" because no such "order" had ever been served upon the 
parties. Since no such "order" was ever served, it was error to 
consider non-compliance with its deadlines as justifying summary 
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judgment of dismissal. That is however what the trial courtfs 
action has effectively done. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), reversing a trial court's ruling which 
excluded expert testimony on a damage issue. The relevant facts 
in Dugan are nearly identical to those presented here. In that 
case, a pretrial conference was held at which it was verbally 
agreed that experts were to be identified by a certain time. 
Neither party submitted a formal pretrial order, nor did the court 
prepare one itself. During trial, the trial court excluded the 
testimony of an expert witness for failure to identify the witness 
in accordance with the pretrial verbal agreement. 
As indicated above, the Utah Supreme Court significantly 
described at least three factors which compelled its decision to 
reverse because of the exclusion. All three of those factors 
appear to be present in this case: 
"First, the court's order was never reduced to writing. 
Although this court is not aware of an explicit statutory 
requirement that pretrial orders in this state be 
written, the practice is encouraged. ... Second, the 
matter was tried before the court without a jury. .. . 
Third, the court could have used means other than 
exclusion to sanction [the party] for their noncompliance 
with the order, including imposing costs incurred by the 
other parties in obtaining experts." Id. at 1244 
(citation omitted) 
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In Dugan, as here, the effect of the trial court's exclusion 
of the expert's testimony appeared in the trial judge's finding 
that "there is no competent evidence introduced from which the 
Court could find [in favor of the plaintiff]." According to the 
authority of Dugan, the trial court in the present case committed 
manifest error by excluding in its entirety the testimony of expert 
witnesses in opposing affidavits as a sanction for belated, or even 
no designation. If any sanction were appropriate, it should be 
something less than the outright dismissal which resulted from the 
trial court's election to totally disregard all opposing 
affidavits. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment of dismissal represents manifest error 
which should be corrected by reversal and remand. 
DATED this M h day of July, 1991. 
ANTHONY^/ THURBER ~ 
Attorney top: ApnellanJ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on this day of July, 1991, I 
mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief to the following: 
Elliott J. Williams 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-4567 
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ADDENDDM 
ADDENDUM # 1 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS - A3483 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORRIE ANN ARNOLD, FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT 
V. 
DR. GLADE B. CURTIS, 
Civil No. 890900890-CV 
Defendant. 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Dr. Glade B. 
Curtis came on regularly for hearing on the 22nd day of February, 
1991, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. Anthony M. 
Thurber, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiff Lorie Ann Arnold. 
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendant Dr. 
Glade B. Curtis. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings and records on file 
herein, having heard oral argument of counsel and being fully 
advised in the premises, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This is a medical malpractice action in which the 
plaintiff alleges that she has sustained loss, injury and damage 
EXHIBIT "D" 
MAR 1 8 1991 
\. C-juiy Cor 
as a consequence of an alleged failure of the defendant to make a 
timely diagnosis of an adenocarcinoma of the bowel. 
2. The defendant is a medical doctor who is a specialist in 
obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Curtis began providing 
obstetrical care to the plaintiff in September 1986, and 
continued as her obstetrician until her pregnancy was terminated 
in January 19 87. 
3. The plaintiff commenced this action in February 1989, 
and on April 23, 1990 certified the case as ready for trial 
representing that all discovery had been completed. 
4. On June 18, 1990, the Court, Judge Raymond s. Uno 
presiding, held a scheduling conference with both counsel of 
record in attendance. With the concurrence of counsel, the Court 
ordered designation of all witnesses by October 31, 1990, and 
completion of additional discovery by December 31, 1990. The 
trial of the case was scheduled to begin on March 5, 1991. 
5. No motions have been made at any time to request a 
change in the Courtfs scheduling Order or a continuance of the 
trial. 
6. On October 31, 1990, the defendant filed and served his 
designation of witnesses which identified, among others, Gary H. 
Johnson, M.D., as an expert witness. Although plaintiff in 
Answers to Interrogatories previously identified Don Houston, 
M.D. as a potential expert witness, no designation of witnesses 
was filed as ordered by the Court. 
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7. On October 5, 1990, defendant filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment supported by the Affidavit of Gary H. Johnson, M.D., a 
specialist in obstetrics and gynecology and in gynecologic 
oncology. JCn Dr. Johnson1s opinion, as stated in his affidavit, 
the care the defendant provided complied with the standards of 
care observed and followed by specialists in obstetrics and 
gynecology and, in any event, an earlier diagnosis of the 
adenocarcinoma would not have changed the outcome. 
8. On December 31, 1990, the plaintiff responded to the 
defendants motion with the Affidavit of Don Houston, M.D., who 
is a specialist in general surgery. Dr. Houston stated that he 
is familiar with the standards of care "utilized by medical 
practitioners," but his affidavit is devoid of any assertion that 
he is familiar with the standards of care of a specialist in 
obstetrics and gynecology or that such standards are identical to 
those standards with which he is familiar. 
9. On January 7, 1991, the defendant filed his Reply 
Memorandum arguing that Dr. Houston's affidavit failed to 
establish a sufficient foundation of knowledge about the 
standards of care applicable to an obstetrician/gynecologist to 
permit his opinion to create a genuine dispute as to any material 
fact. 
10. On January 29, 1991, in response to the defendant's 
Reply Memorandum, plaintiff filed an "Additional Witness 
Designation" identifying, for the first time, Dr. Kenneth 
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McHenry, an obstetrician/gynecologist, as an expert witness- On 
that date the plaintiff also filed an affidavit from Dr. McHenry, 
The defendant moved to strike the affidavit due to the 
plaintiff's untimely designation of the witness and untimely 
submission of his affidavit. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a 
medical malpractice action is ordinarily required to provide 
competent expert testimony to establish that the defendant 
deviated from the applicable standard of care and that the 
departure from standard proximately caused the plaintiff's 
injuries. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980). The 
issues presented in this case are clearly beyond the knowledge of 
laymen and thus expert testimony is required. 
2. The standard of care by which the defendant's conduct is 
to be measured in this action is the standard of care observed 
and followed by physicians practicing the specialty of obstetrics 
and gynecology. Practitioners of other specialties would not 
ordinarily be competent to testify as experts on the standard of 
care applicable to this case. Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P. 2d 245 
(Utah 1985). An exception would be allowed if the party offering 
a witness establishes that the witness in another specialty is 
knowledgeable about the standard of care of an 
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obstetrician/gynecologist with respect to the matters at issue 
and that the standards of the different specialties on those 
issues are the same. Martin v. Mott, 744 P. 2d 337, 339 (Utah 
App. 1897). 
3. The defendant has provided competent expert testimony 
from Gary H. Johnson, M.D., that the care and treatment the 
plaintiff received from the defendant complied with applicable 
standards of care and that an earlier diagnosis of the 
adenocarcinoma would not have altered the plaintiff's outcome. 
4. The plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient 
foundation to demonstrate that Dr. Don Houston, a general 
surgeon, is knowledgeable and competent to testify about the 
standard of care of an obstetrician/gynecologist with respect to 
the matters at issue in this case. Consequently, the affidavit 
of Dr. Houston fails to raise a material issue of fact as to 
whether the defendant's care was appropriate or whether the 
plaintiff sustained any injury as a consequence of any delay in 
diagnosis. Burton v. Youngblood, supra; Martin v. Mott, supra; 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1987). 
5. The plaintiff's designation of Dr. McHenry as an expert 
witness is untimely as it was made long after the deadline 
imposed by the Court's scheduling Order. No motion was made to 
extend that deadline. The plaintiff also failed to comply with 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration in filing 
the affidavit of Dr. McHenry after the deadline for responding to 
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the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment had expired. For 
these reasons, the Court will not consider the affidavit of Dr. 
McHenry and consequently it will not preclude the imposition of 
summary judgment. Summerhays v. Holm, 468 P.2d 366 (Utah 1970). 
6. On the state of the record there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and defendant Dr. Glade B. Curtis is 
entitled to judgment in his favor and against plaintiff Lorrie 
Ann Arnold, no cause of action. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law the Court now enters the following: 
JUDGMENT 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Glade B. Curtis 
be, and the same is, hereby granted and judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the defendant and against plaintiff, no cause 
of action. 
DATED this / I) day of March, 1991. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS, being duly sworn, says that he is 
counsel for defendant herein; that he served the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Case No. 
890900890-CV, before the Salt Lake County District Court, upon 
the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Attorney for Plaintiff: 
Anthony M. Thurber 
Judge Building, Suite 735 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 7th day of March, 1991, 
ELLIOTT' J. WILLIAMS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7th day of March, 
1991. 
annENDUM # 2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD, LORRIE ANN 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
CURTIS, GLADE B DR 
DEFENDANT. 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NCTICE 
CASE NO. 890900890 CV 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S UNO 
.M. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON JUNE 18, 1990 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AMD MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MARCH 5, 1991 AT 10:00 A. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 04 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR JURY TRIAL. COUNSEL ARE TO 
SUBMIT AN AGREED SET OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COURT BY 
FEBRUARY 4, 1991. OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED 
SEPARATELY. 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
DECEMBER 31, 1990 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY JANUARY 18, 1991 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
OCTOBER 31, 1990 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
FEBRUARY 4, 1991 AT 9:00 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AMD WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $10,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PERPARE AN 
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
DATED THIS 18TH DAY OF JUNE ,x*l 9 9 0 . 
LS 
rJU^^ -frr^if^ .£. 4-& K&0" 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. (;t 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, 
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING: 
THUR3ER, ANTHONY M. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
3 EAST BROADWAY 
SUITE 735 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
WILLIAMS, ELLIOTT J. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 
ELEVENTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145 
DATED THIS DAY OF 19 
DEPUTY CLERK 
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ADDENDUM 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
ELIZABETH KING (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORRIE ANN ARNOLD, AFFIDAVIT OF GARY H. JOHNSON, 
M.D. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 890900890-CV 
DR. GLADE B. CURTIS, 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
GARY H. JOHNSON, M.D. being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. My name is Gary H. Johnson, M.D. and the information 
contained in this Affidavit is true and is based on my personal 
knowledge. 
2. That I am a medical doctor with a specialty in 
Obstetrics/Gynecology and Oncology. I am licensed to practice 
medicine in the State of Utah, with my offices located in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
3. That I was involved in the practice of medicine in 
obstetrics and gynecology in the State of Utah during 1986, the 
time in question in the Complaint of Lorrie Ann Arnold, 
4. That I am familiar with the standards of professional 
care, learning, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and used 
by obstetricians in this and similar communities in 1986. 
Specifically, I am familiar with the standards of appropriate 
medical practice involved in the evaluation and treatment of 
patients presenting for prenatal care and the development, as in 
this case, of colorectal cancer. 
5. That I have been board certified by the American Board 
of Obstetrics/Gynecology. My education and training are outlined 
in my curriculum vitae attached hereto. 
6. That my opinions set forth in this Affidavit are based 
upon my review of: 
(a) The Complaint filed in this matter; and 
(b) The medical records of Lorrie Ann Arnold. 
7. That the medical records set forth above in paragraph 
6(b) are the type of records generally relied upon by physicians 
in their day-to-day practice to determine the history, care and 
treatment of patients. 
8. That from my total review of the medical records and 
other information received, and based upon my experience and 
expertise as an obstetrician and as an oncologist, it is my 
opinion that the medical care and treatment rendered by Dr. Glade 
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B. Curtis to Lorrie Ann Arnold complied in all respects with the 
standards of professional care, learning, skill and treatment 
ordinarily possessed and used by practitioners in good standing 
in this and similar communities in 1986. 
9. That based upon Dr. Curtis1 records, the obstetrical 
care rendered to Lorrie Arnold was appropriate; he acted 
responsibly and appropriately to the patient's complaints. 
10. That in any event, had an earlier diagnosis been made, 
the outcome would have been the same as the infant could not have 
been delivered sooner. 
11. That Dr. Curtis' diagnosis and treatment of the 
colorectal cancer was timely and appropriate; and that based upon 
my review of the medical records as previously referenced, the 
allegations of medical negligence and malpractice against Dr. 
Curtis are not supported by the documentation. 
DATED this h / day of November, 1990. 
Gary H.-'' Johns on/M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c ^ - day of 
November, 1990. 
NOTARY IPUBLIC NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res/idii/g a t : Jb?V /Q& £/£ 
My Commission Expires 
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